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Summary
To judgecausality, organismsmustdetermine the tem-
poral order of their actions and sensations. However,
this judgment may be confounded by changing delays
in sensory pathways, suggesting the need for dynamic
temporal recalibration. To test for such a mechanism,
we artificially injected a fixed delay between partici-
pants’ actions (keypresses) and subsequent sensa-
tions (flashes). After participants adapted to this delay,
flashesat unexpectedly short delaysafter thekeypress
wereoftenperceived asoccurringbefore the keypress,
demonstrating a recalibration of motor-sensory tem-
poral order judgments.Whenparticipants experienced
illusory reversals, fMRI BOLD signals increased in
anterior cingulate cortex/medial frontal cortex (ACC/
MFC), a brain region previously implicated in conflict
monitoring. This illusion-specific activation suggests
that the brain maintains not only a recalibrated repre-
sentation of timing, but also a less-plastic representa-
tion against which to compare it.
Introduction
Correctly judging the order of action and sensation is es-
sential for determining causality, an assessment funda-
mental for learning and survival. Imagine you are walking
through a forest and hear a twig crack. Did it happen
when your foot fell or just before? If it happened just be-
fore, the sound may alert you to a nearby predator. If the
sound happened coincident with your step, then it was
a normal occurrence consistent with the sensory feed-
back expected during walking. However, the ability to
*Correspondence: david@eaglemanlab.net
7 These authors contributed equally to this work.correctly judge temporal order may be confounded by
changing delays in sensory pathways—e.g., due to ret-
inal response times in different lighting conditions (Pur-
pura et al., 1990) or, on longer time scales, due to limb
growth (Campbell et al., 1981). Accordingly, the nervous
system must be able to recalibrate its expectations
about the normal temporal relationship between actions
and sensations to overcome changing latencies and
correctly determine causality.
Previous work has reported that a delayed sensory ef-
fect is judged to appear slightly earlier in time if it follows
a voluntary action (Haggard et al., 2002; Eagleman and
Holcombe, 2002). This effect could result from a com-
pression of time between actions and subsequent sen-
sory events, such that all sensations following actions
appear to draw closer to the actions (intentional bind-
ing). An alternative hypothesis, which we explore here,
suggests that the perceived timing of sensory events
shifts with respect to the perceived timing of actions
(Figure 1A). In this alternative hypothesis, sensory
events appearing at a consistent delay after motor ac-
tions are interpreted as consequences of those actions,
and the brain recalibrates timing judgments to make
them consistent with a prior expectation that sensory
feedback will follow motor actions without delay. This
alternative hypothesis predicts a novel illusion: partici-
pants will perceive sensory events as occurring before
their actions when in reality the events occurred after-
ward (Figure 1A). A similar effect of order reversal has
once been reported anecdotally (Cunningham et al.,
2001), but was never verified or quantified. To look
for evidence of motor-sensory time recalibration, we
designed a psychophysical experiment in which we
probed participants’ perceptions after they adapted to
an injected delay between their actions and sensory
feedback.
While much effort has recently focused on finding
brain areas involved in time estimation using fMRI
(Bushara et al., 2001; Coull et al., 2004; Pouthas et al.,
2005; Jech et al., 2005; Lewis and Miall, 2006), no exper-
iment has yet looked for neural signature of temporal re-
calibration. There are at least two hypotheses about
what might be found using imaging. First, when exposed
to a consistent delay, the brain may simply adjust a set-
point in such a way that a contrast between its activity in
the adapted and unadapted cases would show no differ-
ence. On the other hand, if different activity is found be-
fore and after calibration, this could indicate the exis-
tence of latent (baseline) representations of time which
do not adapt to the brief exposure and which conflict
with the quickly adapting representations. That is, if
multiple representations of temporal order exist in the
brain, we would expect to see signatures of neural
conflict during those times when the representations
disagree (i.e., one representation concludes that A
came before B, the other that B came before A). To dis-
tinguish these hypotheses of single versus multiple
representations of temporal order, we seek the neural
signatures of motor-sensory temporal recalibration
using fMRI.
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652Figure 1. Does Adaptation to a Delay Induce a Shift in Motor-Sensory Temporal Order Judgments?
(A) Schematic of hypothesis: participants exposed to delayed sensory feedback (filled flash) calibrate temporal order judgments to reduce the
delay between motor output and sensory feedback. After recalibration, the delayed feedback appears closer in time to the keypress, erroneously
causing an unexpected flash appearing at a sooner time (hollow flash) to be perceived as occurring before the motor act. Only one flash appears
on any given trial.
(B) Task design: participants are cued to press a key. A flash appears on the screen after the cue and sometime before or after the keypress. On
60% of trials, the flash appears at a fixed time with respect to the keypress (35 ms afterward in the baseline block and 135 ms afterward in the
injected delay block). On the other 40% of trials, the flash appears at an unexpected time somewhere before or after the keypress. At the end of
every trial, participants report whether the flash appeared before or after their keypress.Results
Effect of Motor-Sensory Adaptation
on Temporal Order Judgments
Experiment 1: Illusory Reversal of Temporal Order
To look for evidence of motor-sensory time recalibra-
tion, we designed a temporal order experiment in which
we manipulated the relationships between motor acts
and their sensory consequences. On most trials, we in-
jected a fixed 135 ms delay between participants’ key-
press and a subsequent flash. On the other trials, the
flash appeared at a variable delay either before or after
the participant’s keypress. After every trial, we asked
participants to report their perceptions of the temporal
order of flash and keypress. We refer to this block of
trails as the ‘‘injected delay block.’’ We ran a second,
similar test in which the most frequent trials appeared
at a fixed delay of 35 ms (the minimum delay possible
on our computer system), which we call the ‘‘baseline
block’’ (Figure 1B; further details, including our method
for presenting the flash before the keypress, can be
found in Experimental Procedures).
For each participant, the point of subjective simulta-
neity (PSS) was taken as the keypress-flash time differ-
ence at which he reported ‘‘keypress before flash’’ at
50% probability (Figure 2). We compared each partici-
pant’s PSS from the baseline and injected delay blocks.
Twenty-four of twenty-five participants’ psychometric
functions shifted in the positive direction (average PSS
shift 44 6 7 ms, standard error of the mean, p < 1026;
Figure 3A). Thus, a flash appearing in a 44 ms window
after the keypress would usually elicit an ‘‘after’’ report
in the baseline block but elicit a ‘‘before’’ report in the
injected delay block. This is the first quantification of
an illusory reversal of temporal order of action and sen-
sation. The slopes of the curves (reflecting the precision
of the temporal order judgment) did not differ signifi-
cantly in the two blocks (two-tailed paired t test,p < 0.43; Figure 3A, first column), suggesting no change
in task difficulty.
Experiment 2: Test for Motor-Sensory versus
Cross-Sensory Recalibration
To address the possibility that the effect we have shown
reflects a cross-sensory, rather than a motor-sensory
recalibration, we repeated the experiment with the fol-
lowing variation: the key automatically moved up to
tap the participant’s finger instead of the other way
around, and participants judged the order of the tap
and a flash. In this cross-sensory condition, we found a
small shift in the PSS between the baseline and injected
Figure 2. Reversal of Perceived Order of Actions and Subsequent
Events
Temporal order experiment data from a representative participant in
the baseline (blue) and injected delay (red) blocks. Dot size reflects
the number of trials at each delay between key and flash times.
Curves are logistic distribution functions. The dashed line intersects
the 50% point of each curve, referred to as the point of subjective
simultaneity (PSS).
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653Figure 3. Motor-Sensory, Cross-Sensory, and Uncued Motor-Sensory Data
(A) Motor-sensory experiment from Figures 1 and 2. For each subject, the PSS for the baseline (blue) and 100 ms injected delay (red) blocks are
represented by the ticks. The angle of a tick corresponds to the slope of the psychometric curve, and the position of the tick on the x axis
corresponds to the mean of the curve. The slopes in the injected delay block and in the baseline block were not significantly different (two-tailed
t test, p < 0.43). The second column shows the collected data from all participants in each test, plotted as a single psychometric function. As in
Figure 2, the area inside the circles reflects the number of trials at each offset. The third column shows the mean PSS shift with SEM.
(B) Cross-sensory condition, in which the key taps the participant’s finger rather than the other way around.
(C) Uncued motor-sensory condition in which participants’ perceptions were not probed on trials during which they adapted to the injected delay
(60% of trials); instead, participants only made temporal order judgments on the remaining 40% of trials. This procedure equalized the before/
after distribution of trial times in which participants were asked to make perceptual reports in the baseline and injected-delay trial blocks. The
motor-sensory shifts in (A) and (C) are significantly larger than the cross-sensory shift (p < 0.02, p < 0.04, respectively, two-tailed t test). Paren-
thetically, an interesting aspect of the uncued data is the245 ms offset of the baseline curve, in contrast to the +20 ms offset of the baseline curve
in the cued motor-sensory experiment (compare [A] to [C]). This difference may be attributable to the rhythm adopted by participants in the
uncued design (Paillard 1948).delay blocks (166 8 ms, Figure 3B). This cross-sensory
shift, though not quite significant in our study (two-tailed
t test, p = 0.06), is consistent with other reports of small
crossmodal recalibration (Fujisaki et al., 2004; Vroomen
et al., 2004). The magnitude of these shifts is less than
half of the motor-sensory shift of 44 ms, suggesting
that active interaction with the world is a powerful
mechanism for calibrating timing judgments.
Experiment 3: Control for Cognitive Bias
Toward Central Tendency
The cross-sensory data in the previous experiment pro-
vides a control against a cognitive bias such as central
tendency as an explanation for our motor-sensory
data. A central tendency argument would suggest that
since 60% of trials appeared at a long delay in the in-
jected-delay block (making the ‘‘after’’ answer more fre-
quent), participants might bias uncertain answers to-
ward ‘‘before’’ to equalize the number of each kind of
answer. However, since we would expect this bias to
operate just as much in the cross-sensory case as in
the motor-sensory case, the significantly larger motor-
sensory shift is not suggestive of central tendency.
As a further control against central tendency, we de-
signed a new motor-sensory experiment, in which par-
ticipants only made temporal order judgments on a frac-
tion of the trials. They were exposed to a fixed delay on60% of the trials, but they were only probed to make
judgments on the remaining 40%. In these trials, the be-
fore/after probability was evenly distributed. Thus, the
distribution of times between keypress and flash on tri-
als in which subjects reported their perceptions was
identical between the baseline and injected-delay
blocks.
To additionally ensure that the motor-sensory shift
had nothing to do with the cued design, participants
were not cued to make their actions but instead made
keypresses at a time of their own choosing (see Experi-
mental Procedures for details). The data from this
uncued motor-sensory experiment can be seen in
Figure 3C. The PSS shift in this version of the experiment
is almost identical to the original motor-sensory shift
(41 ms 6 8) and significantly larger than the cross-
sensory shift (p < 0.04; Figure 3B). Given these data, it
is unlikely that central tendency can account for the per-
ceptual shift. Additionally, because participants were
exposed to delays using red, yellow, or white flashes
and then asked to make a temporal judgment about
a blue flash (see Experimental Procedures), the result
in Figure 3C demonstrates that the motor-visual recali-
bration is not sensitive to color.
As a framework for understanding these results, we
suggest that sensory events appearing at a consistent
Neuron
654delay after motor actions are interpreted as conse-
quences of those actions, and the brain recalibrates
timing judgments to make them consistent with a prior
expectation that sensory feedback will follow motor
actions without delay. Having recalibrated, the brain
can interpret sensory signals appearing at an earlier
time than the expected feedback as preceding the motor
action.
Experiment 4: Recalibration to Larger Delays
We hypothesize that if the recalibration depends on
a neural interpretation of causality, the size of the mo-
tor-sensory recalibration should be a function of the
size of the injected delay. Specifically, judgments of cau-
sality should be modulated by an expectation that very
long delays do not represent the consequences of
a voluntary action (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002). To
test this hypothesis, we repeated the original experiment
using injected delays of 250, 500, and 1000 ms. Partici-
pants’ PSS shifted by an average of 30 6 16, 13 6 16,
and 24 6 16 ms from the baseline to the 250, 500, and
1000 ms injected delay blocks, respectively (Figure 4),
demonstrating that the effect diminishes as the motor
act and sensory feedback are separated by greater
delays.
Experiment 5: Neural Correlates of the
Motor-Sensory Illusion of Temporal Order
There has been an extensive search for a single, central
clock in the brain, which times events as they come in
through the sensory organs and constructs a single tem-
poral representation of the outside world (Nobre and
O’Reilly 2004; Mangels et al., 1998; Ivry and Spencer,
2004; Buhusi and Meck, 2005). The recalibration of tem-
poral order we have discovered gives us an opportunity
to address the assumption of a single internal clock
(Karmarkar and Buonomano, 2003; Nobre and O’Reilly
2004). While participants’ responses indicate an internal
representation of time which has recalibrated, it may be
that there are other internal representations of time
which have not recalibrated. If this is the case, we might
expect the mismatch to elicit brain activity. To address
Figure 4. Average PSS Shift for Motor-Sensory Experiments with
Injected Delays of 100, 250, 500 and 1000 ms
Bars are significant to p < 1E-6, p < 0.13, p < 0.45, p < 0.80, respec-
tively, two-tailed t test. Error bars are standard error of the mean.this hypothesis, we repeated our baseline and injected
delay tests while subjects were scanned using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). While these tests
are identical perceptually, the fMRI data might reveal
a difference between them neurally. If any area of the
brain shows a different activation on trials featuring illu-
sory reversal than it does on other types of trials, it sug-
gests the existence of multiple timing representations
in the brain, arguing against the single-clock theory.
ACC/MFC Is Activated by the Illusion
As a way of identifying a neural region-of-interest which
might be maximally activated by the illusion, we pro-
duced two contrast images. The first contrast was
made between ‘‘illusion trials’’ (trials in the injected delay
block where the flash came after the baseline PSS but
the participant reported that it happened ‘‘before’’) and
veridical ‘‘before’’ trials (trials in the baseline block in
which the flash appeared before the baseline PSS and
participants reported the flash to come ‘‘before’’). In
these two trial types, the stimuli were different, but the
perception was the same. The second image contrasted
the illusion trials with veridical ‘‘after’’ trials (trials in the
baseline block in which the flash appeared after the
baseline PSS and participants perceived ‘‘after’’). Be-
tween the latter two trial types, the stimuli were the
same, but the perception was different. We reasoned
that the voxels common to these two contrasts would
give us a good candidate for a region maximally acti-
vated by the illusions. The voxels common to both im-
ages lie at the interface of the anterior cingulate cortex
and medial frontal cortex (ACC/MFC, Figure 5A, peak
at MNI, 0, 16, 42; false detection rate [FDR] corrected
at q < 0.05 with a minimum of five contiguous voxels
for each contrast).
Task Difficulty Does Not Explain
ACC/MFC Activation
To address whether the ACC/MFC was maximally acti-
vated by the illusory trials (as compared to other trial
types), we needed to correct for trial difficulty. To ensure
that the trials analyzed were all of approximately equal
difficulty, we chose only those trials in which the flash
appeared close in time to the baseline PSS (within
635 ms, see Difficulty Matching in Experimental Proce-
dures). We grouped these trials by the physical order of
the flash with respect to the baseline PSS and by the
participants’ perceptions on each trial.
The average hemodynamic response on illusory trials
was significantly higher than on any other type of trial
(Figure 5B; p < 0.05, one-tailed t test). Note that the
ACC/MFC is more active during illusions than on trials
in which participants veridically perceived the flash to
occur before their keypress, so the increased activation
cannot be attributed solely to the perception of being
‘‘beaten by the flash’’ (Figure 5C, top panel). Further,
the ACC/MFC is activated more by illusion trials than
by trials with the same delays in which participants
correctly perceive the flash afterward, so we cannot
attribute the high activation to something about the
physical timing of the flash (Figure 5C, second panel).
The increased ACC/MFC activity is unlikely to represent
increased task difficulty, because the trials chosen for
this plot are all from the same range of maximal difficulty
Motor-Sensory Temporal Order Recalibration
655Figure 5. Illusion Maximally Activates ACC/MFC
(A) Region of interest formed by the voxels shared by two contrasts between illusory trials and veridical trials (see text).
(B) Averaged time courses of the BOLD signals in the voxels in (A). Only trials within 35 ms of the baseline PSS were analyzed in order to match for
difficulty between the two blocks. Each curve corresponds to trials indicated by the same color in the inset (left). For example, illusory trials (red)
are those in the injected delay block in which the flash follows the keypress but participants report ‘‘flash before keypress.’’ The number of trials
included appears above the traces, and error bars are standard error of the mean. *Significance value of p < 0.05 (two-tailed t test) between the
illusion data (red) and the data with the color of the star. There were too few orange trials for inclusion.
(C) Schematic: what would be expected if the ACC/MFC activation represented the perception of the flash before the keypress, the flash appear-
ance after the baseline PSS, the difficulty of the trial, the flash appearance as a low probability event (‘‘oddball’’) in the injected delay block, or
a general effect of being exposed to an injected delay.in the participants’ behavioral curves (Figure 5C, third
panel). The ACC is known to be activated by unexpected
stimuli (‘‘oddballs,’’ Linden et al., 1999), thus we might
expect that it is activated by the ‘‘before’’ answer in
the injected delay block simply because of that answer’s
infrequency. However, if this were true, one would also
expect veridical ‘‘before’’ answers to elicit high activa-
tion (gray trials, Figure 5C, fourth panel), which does
not happen. Finally, if the ACC/MFC activation resulted
from the recalibration itself or reflected nothing more
than a new learned relationship between motor timing
and sensory feedback, one might expect it to persist
throughout the entire injected delay block (Figure 5C,
fifth panel). Yet the ACC/MFC signal is not elevated on
trials when the perception in the injected delay block
agrees with what it would have been in the baseline
block (e.g., compare the gray and black curves in
Figure 5B). In summary, if the ACC/MFC were maximally
activated by anything other than the illusory trials, the
data in Figure 5B would look different.
Neural Signal Reflects Amount of Recalibration
We have established that the ACC/MFC is maximally
activated during trials when participants experienced
an order-reversal illusion. Since some participants reca-
librated more than others, we reasoned that ACC/MFCactivity might reflect the range of the illusory reports.
To explore this, we separately analyzed participants
whose PSS shift was less than 33 ms (the ‘‘small adap-
tors’’), and those whose shift of more than 33 ms (the
‘‘big adaptors’’; Figure 6).
The peak ACC/MFC BOLD response from each trial
were binned by the time between keypress and flash
(DT) of the trial (50 ms bins, peak times were taken 6 s
after the trial start). For each bin, we tested for a signif-
icant difference between the peaks of the activity in
the injected delay block and in the baseline block. For
the big adaptors, the difference between the ACC/MFC
activation in the injected delay blocks was significant
(p < 0.05, two-sample t test) when DT was between 16
and 66 ms, which is exactly where we see the maximum
behavioral difference. For small adaptors, we did not
find a significant difference in any range, nor any bin
width.
Discussion
We have found that events which consistently lag
actions can lead to a recalibration of temporal order
judgments. This suggests that temporal order judg-
ments between motor acts and sensory events dynam-
ically change in order to keep causality assessments
Neuron
656Figure 6. Maximal ACC/MFC Activation
Overlaps Behavioral Shift of Big and Small
Adaptors
When comparing baseline to injected blocks,
the ACC/MFC activation difference is most
significant when the behavioral difference is
maximal. We separated participants into
those whose PSS shift was larger than 33
ms (the big adaptors) and those with a posi-
tive shift smaller than 33 ms (the small adap-
tors). For each DT between keypress and
flash, we collected the peak ACC/MFC acti-
vations for each trial (in 50 ms bins centered
around the baseline PSS). For big adaptors,
the ACC/MFC activation in trials where DT
was between 16 and 66 ms was significantly greater in the 100 ms injected delay block than in the adapted block. This is exactly the range of
the maximal behavioral difference for the big adaptors, whose mean PSS shifted from 16 to 57 6 6 ms. We failed to find a significant difference
in ACC/MFC activation for range of DT for the small adaptors. This provides further evidence that the ACC/MFC activation correlates with
illusions of temporal order resulting from recalibration.appropriately calibrated. This recalibration causes sen-
sory inputs which occurred just after motor actions to
appear as though they came beforehand—an illusory
reversal of temporal order (Figure 1A). We suggest that
the calibration of motor-sensory timing results from
a prior expectation of little or no delay between outgoing
actions and resulting sensory effects. The illusory rever-
sals coincide with maximal ACC/MFC activation, sug-
gesting the existence of at least two representations of
temporal order in the brain—one which rapidly adapts
to the injected delay and one which retains its baseline
timing judgments.
With regard to the temporal order illusion, an open
question is why only a few participants showed a PSS
shift equal to the size of the injected delay. We attemp-
ted to increase the size of the shift by exposing partici-
pants to 75 trials at the adaptation delay before the
test began, but that had little effect. By pooling all of
the participants’ behavioral data and examining a run-
ning average of the PSS shift, we noticed that the recali-
bration appears to reach its full magnitude within w20
trials (data not shown). It may be that motor-sensory
timing shifts of 100 ms are beyond the hardware limita-
tions of the calibration mechanisms. Another possibility
is that adaptation to injected delays battles the existing
calibration cemented in by years of experience, such
that a much longer exposure to the injected delay would
be required to increase the effect.
Differential Neural Responses Suggest the
Possibility of Multiple Timing Representations
We have found that a small brain region at the border of
the ACC and MFC is maximally activated when partici-
pants, having adapted to an injected delay, experience
an illusion that a flash preceded their keypress. We sug-
gest that for a region of the brain to be maximally
activated exclusively by illusion trials, the brain must
contain representations of both the recalibrated and
the baseline timing. Our reasoning is as follows: the
PSS shift in the behavioral data shows that a timing rep-
resentation exists (namely, the one which determines
the perceptual report) which adapts to the injected
delay. In order for a region of the brain to become max-
imally activated only on those trials when the recali-brated representation disagrees with what the baseline
representation would have reported, the brain must
have a latent or stored version of the baseline represen-
tation. We find such an activation in a region that has
been implicated in conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Holroyd et al., 2004).
The ACC is activated in other fMRI experiments which
have employed the Stroop task (Pardo et al., 1990;
Leung et al., 2000) and Flanker task (Botvinick et al.,
1999—tasks in which sensory input is thought to acti-
vate conflicting neural representations (Figure 7). Neigh-
boring areas in the medial frontal cortex have also been
implicated in conflict (Nachev et al., 2005). Our results
may be consistent with the above studies, in that ACC/
MFC activation in our experiment seems to result from
a mismatch between answers resulting from separate
timing representations. Many theories of ACC function
suggest that it selects behavioral actions (Paus, 2001),
monitors conflict in support of behavioral adjustment
(Kerns et al., 2004), assesses the consequences of a
decision (Walton et al., 2004), predicts error likelihood
(Brown and Braver, 2005; Carter et al., 1998), or signals
Figure 7. ACC/MFC in the Conflict and Timing Literatures
Coordinates of peak activation found in five papers overlaid onto the
ACC/MFC activation shown in Figure 5 (black).
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657the difference between predicted and actual conse-
quences of an action (Ito et al., 2003). These theories
stress that the ACC is involved in the pursuit of reward.
Our task involves no explicit reward or error signals, so it
is difficult to say whether our data supports any of these
theories. Note that if we expect that the ACC is activated
by conflict, we would only expect it to be maximally
activated at times when two timing representations do
not agree (that is, during the illusory trials), rather than
during the entire trial block.
Since ACC is involved in signaling conflict, we might
expect it to become activated during other kinds of per-
ceptual illusions, and indeed it does—for example, in
binocular rivalry (Lumer et al., 1998; Cosmelli et al., 2004).
Note that not all perceptual illusions will be expected to
activate the ACC, but only those in which multiple repre-
sentations of the stimuli compete in the brain.
Some experiments have found activation of similar re-
gions as ours in time-estimation tasks (Coull et al., 2004;
Lau et al., 2004; Eagleman, 2004; Pouthas et al., 2005;
Rao et al., 2001), while others have not (Nenadic et al.,
2003). Looking at all seven hemodynamic response
functions in Figure 5B, it appears that while the ACC/
MFC is preferentially activated by illusory trials, it is
somewhat activated by all trials in the task. It is difficult
to know whether the baseline ACC/MFC activation on all
trials in this study represents time estimation, as other
studies might suggest, a basal level of conflict, or
some other kind of activity. It will be interesting to ex-
plore how ACC/MFC activity relates to Insular activity,
which has been shown to encode the perception of
agency (Farrer and Frith, 2002).
Some theories of the ACC suggest that it is involved in
conflict resolution (Botvinick et al., 2001). If this oc-
curred in our experiment, we might expect the activation
to go away after a sufficiently long period of adaptation;
further experiments will be necessary to know whether
this happens. Moreover, if the conflict resolution acted
to resolve the discrepancy between timing representa-
tions by recalibrating the injected-delay PSS to its base-
line value, we might expect the behavioral evidence of
adaptation to disappear after the subject sees enough
illusions. This will be explored in further studies.
Experimental Procedures
Behavioral Methods
Each trial block consisted of 100 trials and was run once per partic-
ipant. On each trial, the participant pressed the button as quickly
as he could in response to a cue. The software kept a running average
of each participant’s reaction time to the cue, making it possible to
probabilistically place flashes just before the keypress. There were
two randomly ordered trial blocks—the ‘‘baseline’’ and ‘‘injected de-
lay’’ blocks. Flashes were distributed throughout a trial block such
that 60% appeared at a consistent delay (35 ms in baseline block,
135 ms in injected delay block) and the rest were distributed in a
Gaussian centered 60 ms after the keypress with a width of 80 ms—
this distribution attempted to maximize the number of trials at the
steep part of the psychometric functions. The distribution of these
40 trials was the approximately the same in both the baseline and in-
jected delay blocks. For a sense of the distribution of flashes, refer to
the sizes of the dots in Figure 2 and Figure 3, middle column. In those
figures, the radius of the dots is proportional to the square root of the
number of trials. Trials of different delays were randomly interleaved
within a block, and the blocks were randomly ordered. On average,
in the fMRI baseline block, 47% of the reports ended up being ‘‘flashbefore keypress’’ as opposed to 32% in the injected delay block (the
probabilities were 38% and 26% outside the scanner).
In this manuscript, the PSS at a 35 ms delay (that is, during the
baseline block) is called the baseline PSS. This is the marker against
which the adapted PSS is compared, and by which participants are
combined with each other in the fMRI analysis. We classify as ‘‘illu-
sions’’ those trials in the injected delay block in which the flash ap-
pears after the baseline PSS, but the participant reports it to occur
‘‘before.’’ Since we do not know how participants choose the marker
against which to compare the time of the flash (e.g., the time at the
first activity in motor cortex, the time when his finger touches the
key, or the time when the key is fully depressed), the baseline PSS
is the best measure of simultaneity we have for a given subject. It
may be that what we call the baseline PSS (on average 20 6 5 ms
after the time that the computer registered a keypress) is actually
representative of some adaptation to a 35 ms delay typical of com-
puters. If true, our measure of the PSS shift may be diluted—i.e.,
a motor-sensory shift from a 0 ms delay condition would be even
larger than what we have reported here.
Before running the experiment, participants were required to pass
a training version of the task, in which flashes appeared randomly
distributed before or after their keypress on all trials (i.e., there
was no consistently presented delay). For feedback during this train-
ing, flashes were defined as ‘‘before’’ the keypress if they came any-
where up to 35 ms (the delay due to our graphics card) after the key-
press and ‘‘after’’ if they came later than that. Participants gained
one point for correctly identifying before/after (as defined above)
and lost five points for incorrect answers. If they could accrue 25
points, we allowed them to participate in the experiment.
For the cross-sensory test (Figure 3B), the button lightly tapped
the participant (the button was attached to a driver which provided
anw10 ms tap to the bottom of the participant’s finger). This cross-
sensory (or ‘‘involuntary’’) condition was designed such that the
statistics of timing between key events and flashes was the same
as in the motor-sensory experiment.
In the uncued motor-sensory experiment shown in Figure 3C,
a participant’s finger tap caused a red, white, or yellow light-emitting
diode (led) to flash at a fixed delay (0 ms in the baseline block, 100 ms
in the injected delay block). After 5–12 such finger taps, a blue flash
appeared sometime just before or after the participant’s next finger
tap (our software attempted to predict the time of the participant’s
next finger tap from the loose rhythm participants tended to adopt
and then presented the flash in a uniform random distribution be-
tween 6150 ms of the participant’s keypress on each trial). Partici-
pants were instructed to recognize the trial with the blue flash as
the ‘‘probe’’ trial and answered whether the blue flash had come
before or after the time of their last finger tap. These probe trials
were evenly distributed between ‘‘before’’ and ‘‘after’’ answers,
and this was true in both the baseline and injected delay blocks.
Finally, a note on our methods—Libet’s clock face paradigm has
been used in the past to test questions of relative timing of action
and effect (Haggard et al., 2002). In that paradigm, participants watch
a rapidly moving clock hand and report the position of the hand at the
moment they perceive some event (the ‘‘probe’’). We have been con-
cerned that this methodology may introduce a confound in the form
of the flash-lag effect (Nijhawan, 1994; Eagleman and Sejnowski,
2000a), in which the position of a moving object is reported to be fur-
ther along in its trajectory than its physical position at the time of
probing. Importantly, the flash lag effect is modified by predictability
(Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000b, Namba and Baldo, 2004): the more
predictable the time of the probe, the smaller the positional offset.
Thus, it may be that beeps following a voluntary button press are
more predictable than surprise beeps. If true, this complicates the
interpretation of an earlier report by Haggard et al. (2002), in which
the use of a Libet clock paradigm produced the result that beeps
following 250 ms after a voluntary keypress were reported at an ear-
lier time on the clock face. To avoid confounds, we designed our ex-
periment so that flashes are equally unpredictable in all conditions.
fMRI Methods
Of 38 right-handed participants scanned, 19 pressed the key in re-
sponse to the cue with their right hand and answered the ‘‘before/
after’’ question with their left hand, while the other 19 performed
the task with hands reversed. High-resolution T1-weighted scans
Neuron
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seconds elapsed between the time of the cue (and flash and initial
keypress) and the time at which the participant was asked to report
her perceptions. For some participants, we reduced the 6–12 s delay
to 2–4 s on some of the adaptation trials (the frequent trials appear-
ing at 35 or 135 ms) in order to decrease the total time the participant
spent in the scanner, but these trials were excluded from the time
course plot in Figure 5B.
Functional run details were as follows: echo-planar imaging, gra-
dient recalled echo; repetition time (TR) = 2000 ms; echo time (TE) =
40 ms; flip angle = 90; 643 64 matrix, 29 4 mm axial slices, yielding
functional 3.4 mm 3 3.4 mm 3 4.0 mm voxels. Data analysis was
performed using SPM2 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm2) and visualized using xjView (http://people.hnl.bcm.tmc.edu/
cuixu/xjView). Motion correction to the first functional scan was per-
formed using a six parameter rigid-body transformation (Kao et al.,
2005). The average of the motion-corrected images was coregis-
tered to each individual’s structural MRI using a 12 parameter affine
transformation. The images were spatially normalized to the MNI
template by applying a 12 parameter affine transformation, followed
by a nonlinear warping using basis functions (Kao et al., 2005). Im-
ages were then smoothed with an 8 mm isotropic Gaussian kernel
and highpass filtered in the temporal domain (filter width of 128s,
King-Casas et al., 2005).
Fourteen participants in the behavioral tests also participated in
the fMRI tests, and 11 participants from the right-handed set of
fMRI tests were repeated in the left-handed version. The mean
PSS shift in the fMRI scanner was 356 5 ms. In order to find a region
of interest, we performed a general-linear-model regression. For
each block, we separated trials in which the flash preceded the
keypress from those in which it followed the keypress. We further
separated those trials after which the participant would report ‘‘flash
before key’’ from those after which the participant would report ‘‘key
before flash.’’
Using SPM2, we performed two separate multiple regressions,
one for each trial block. To define the regressors, we identified
‘‘cue’’ trials as those in which the participants saw the cue and flash
and pressed the key and ‘‘response’’ trials as those in which the par-
ticipant reported his perception (usually about 6 s after each ‘‘cue’’
trial). We further separated the cue trials by whether the flash
came before or after the baseline PSS and by whether the participant
perceived the flash as before or after his keypress, leaving us with
six total regressors. After performing the regressions, we formed
two random-effect contrasts (a t test of differences in b values).
We contrasted the illusory trials (trials in the injected-delay block
when the flash appeared after the baseline PSS but the perception
was ‘‘before’’) to the veridical trials (baseline block, flash before
baseline PSS, perception ‘‘before’’; baseline block, flash after base-
line PSS, perception ‘‘after’’). Both of these contrasts were required
to pass a threshold of p < 0.001 with at least five continuous voxels.
They were further required to pass a false discovery rate (FDR) test
of q < 0.05 (Genovese et al., 2002). We used the common voxels of
these two contrasts as a region of interest (Figure 5A). Note that
the GLM contrast is not difficulty matched, as the GLM contrast is
intended only as a means of obtaining a region-of-interest to use
in the time-course plots. For the reasoning behind differentiating
based on the participants baseline PSS (rather than true simultaneity
of keypress and flash as measured by the computer) see Behavioral
Methods, above. If one repeats the analysis for Figure 5B based
on true 0, rather than the baseline PSS, the results are qualitatively
similar, but some of the significant differences disappear.
Difficulty Matching
In order to match trials for difficulty (Figure 5) we chose trials that lay
between PSSbaseline235 ms and PSSbaseline +35 ms. This window of
35 ms is smaller than half of the average standard deviation of the
psychometric functions, ensuring that all trials within the window
are of approximately equal difficulty. 35 ms is also the average
size of the PSS shift, ensuring that the trials in the 35 ms window af-
ter the baseline PSS in the injected delay block have approximately
equal distribution of answers as those in the 35 ms window before
the baseline PSS in the baseline block. We separated trials by their
timing with respect to their temporal relationship to the baseline PSS
and by the participant’s perceptions, resulting in four trial types foreach trial block (Figure 5B, inset). We then plotted the time-course of
the activation in our region-of-interest (the ACC/MFC) for each type
of trial during the 12 s after the participant makes the temporal order
judgment (the cues to report one’s perceptions occurred 6–12 s after
the x axis point labeled 0 in this plot). Difficulty matching in this way
is important to the conclusion that the ACC/MFC is most highly ac-
tivated by the illusion. For example, without difficulty matching
around the baseline PSS (the point at which participants are nor-
mally maximally uncertain about their answer), one could argue
that the ACC/MFC activity on ‘‘illusion’’ trials is higher than the activ-
ity in veridical ‘‘before’’ trials because most of the ‘‘illusion’’ trials
happen just after the baseline PSS, whereas veridical ‘‘before’’ trials
can happen up to 150 ms before the participant’s keypress, making
these trials easier and polluting the average. However, in the diffi-
culty-matched analysis, there are an equal distribution of trials close
to the baseline PSS in the veridical ‘‘before’’ cases (black and gray,
Figure 5B, inset) as in the illusory case. Thus, if trial difficulty (as
measured by proximity to the baseline PSS) were the cause of the
ACC/MFC activation, we would expect to find the black curve just
as high, if not higher, than red curve in Figure 5B.
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